The 9th Circuit's decision in Perfect 10 conflicts with conclusions from other courts including Doe v. The Friendfinder court specifically discussed and rejected the lower court's reading of "intellectual property law" in CCBill and held that the immunity does not reach state right of publicity claims. The plaintiff, Carafano, claimed the false profile defamed her, but because the content was created by a third party, the website was immune, even though it had provided multiple choice selections to aid profile creation.because several courts have interpreted it as providing complete immunity for ISPs with regard to the torts committed by their users over their systems. Immunity was upheld for a website operator for distributing an email to a listserv where the plaintiff claimed the email was defamatory.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (a common name for Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996) is a landmark piece of Internet legislation in the United States, codified at 47 U. this portion of the Act remains in force and allows ISPs and other service providers to restrict customers' actions without fear of being found legally liable for the actions that are allowed.
A defendant must satisfy each of the three prongs to gain the benefit of the immunity: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was not part of the original Senate legislation, but was added in conference with the House of Representatives, where it had been separately introduced by Representatives Christopher Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) as the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act and passed by a near-unanimous vote on the floor.
Section 230(c)(1) provides immunity from liability for providers and users of an "interactive computer service" who publish information provided by others: In analyzing the availability of the immunity offered by this provision, courts generally apply a three-prong test.
The act was passed in part in reaction to the 1995 decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. Prodigy Services Co., which suggested that service providers who assumed an editorial role with regard to customer content, thus became publishers, and legally responsible for libel and other torts committed by customers.
The court rejected these arguments because holding AOL negligent in promulgating harmful content would be equivalent to holding AOL "liable for decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its network -- actions quintessentially related to a publisher's role." Immunity was upheld for an individual internet user from liability for republication of defamatory statement on a listserv.
The court found the defendant to be a "user of interactive computer services" and thus immune from liability for posting information passed to her by the author.
The court rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of Section 230 immunity, ruling that the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants wrote disparaging report titles and headings, and themselves wrote disparaging editorial messages about the plaintiff, rendered them information content providers.
This act was passed to specifically enhance service providers' ability to delete or otherwise monitor content without themselves becoming publishers. America Online, Inc., the Court notes that "Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision. The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obviously chilling effect.
Under that court's holding, computer service providers who regulated the dissemination of offensive material on their services risked subjecting themselves to liability, because such regulation cast the service provider in the role of a publisher. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems. 937 (1998), which held that Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.” This rule effectively protects online entities, including user-generated content websites, that qualify as a "provider or user" of an "interactive computer service." The court upheld AOL's immunity from liability for defamation.
Fearing that the specter of liability would therefore deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230's broad immunity "to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material." In addition, Zeran notes "the amount of information communicated via interactive computer services is . Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. AOL's agreement with the contractor allowing AOL to modify or remove such content did not make AOL the "information content provider" because the content was created by an independent contractor.
Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect." the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the exception for intellectual property law applies only to federal intellectual property claims such as copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and patents, reversing a district court ruling that the exception applies to state-law right of publicity claims. The Court noted that Congress made a policy choice by "providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others." The court upheld immunity for an Internet dating service provider from liability stemming from third party's submission of a false profile.